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Assessing game theory, role playing, and unaided judgment
J. Scott Armstrong
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Abstract
Green’s study [Int. J. Forecasting (forthcoming)] on the accuracy of forecasting methods for conflicts does well against
traditional scientific criteria. Moreover, it is useful, as it examines actual problems by comparing forecasting methods as they
would be used in practice. Some biases exist in the design of the study and they favor game theory. As a result, the accuracy
gain of game theory over unaided judgment may be illusory, and the advantage of role playing over game theory is likely to
be greater than the 44% error reduction found by Green. The improved accuracy of role playing over game theory was
consistent across situations. For those cases that simulated interactions among people with conflicting roles, game theory was
no better than chance (28% correct), whereas role-playing was correct in 61% of the predictions.  2002 International
Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Forecasting; Role playing; Simulated interactions

1. Introduction
In Armstrong (1997a), I reviewed Co-opetition by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996).
Their use of game theory to analyze real-world
situations seemed compelling. I concluded that
it was unfortunate that the decision makers had
not engaged the help of game theorists before
they made their decisions. I had some misgivings about the book, however. For example, was
there any evidence that game theory had led to
better decisions or predictions in conflicts? So I
contacted the authors. Brandenburger responded
that he was not aware of any studies of the
E-mail address: armstrong@wharton.upenn.edu (J.S.
Armstrong).

predictive validity of game theory, and I was
unable to find any such studies.
Many hundreds of academics have been
working on game theory for half a century.
Thus, it seems strange that finding evidence on
its predictive validity is difficult. Imagine that
hundreds of medical researchers spent half a
century developing drugs without testing
whether they worked as predicted. They would
not be allowed to market their drugs.
Kesten Green sent me an early draft of his
paper in July 2000 (Green, 2002). I thought it
was an important contribution because he: (1)
described an important problem, (2) challenged
existing beliefs, (3) obtained surprising results,
(4) used simple methods, (5) provided full
disclosure, and (6) explained it all clearly. In
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short, Green violated all the rules in the ‘Author’s Formula’ (Armstrong, 1982). That formula, based on a review of empirical research,
was updated in Armstrong (1997b). Given
Green’s violations of the formula, I expected
that reviewers would reject the paper. To avoid
rejection, with the permission of Jan deGooijer,
Editor of the International Journal of Forecasting, I informed Green that his paper would be
accepted, subject to reasonable responses to any
substantive reviewers’ concerns.
Green had been systematic in his own evaluation of his study. He rated the study on the 32
principles for the evaluation of forecasting
methods from Armstrong (2001c). His study did
well on 28 of the principles, poorly on three,
with one judged as not relevant. I have reviewed
these ratings and am in agreement. The ratings
are at kestencgreen.com / ratings.pdf.
]]]]]]]]]
I discuss whether: (1) the problem is important, (2) the findings are important, and (3)
the study was done in a competent manner. I
then provide suggestions for further research.
2. Important problem?
Green’s problem can be stated in two parts: Is
it useful to accurately forecast the decisions
made by parties in conflict? If so, which method
can best improve upon the way that people
currently forecast such decisions?
With respect to the first question, it seems
that by better predicting the decisions of one’s
adversary in a conflict, one can make better
decisions. For example, in 1975, Britain refused
to sell the Falkland Islands to a group of
Argentine investors backed by the Argentine
government. As a result, it had to fight a war to
defend its ownership, which was clearly a less
profitable alternative for Britain than selling the
islands. The three Argentine generals involved
had not anticipated Britain’s response to
Argentinian troops occupying the Falkland Islands. They lost the war and their jobs.

Predictions of decisions might also be of
interest to parties outside a conflict. For example, in the case involving the negotiations
between the National Football League owners
and the Players Association, an insurance company offered the players strike insurance. To do
so, it had to forecast the likelihood that the
players would decide to strike.
With respect to the best method to use, Green
examined some of the more important methods
that have been recommended for such situations. For example, game theory is often suggested as a way to predict the behavior of
rational decision makers, and we have ample
evidence from economics that predictions of
rational responses are often accurate, even when
surprising.
The problem of predicting decisions in conflict situations is important.
3. Important findings?
Green’s results show substantial differences
in accuracy among methods. On average, the
best method, role playing, had half the error rate
of the worst method, unaided judgment, in
predicting actual decisions. In five of the six
situations, he found that role playing improved
accuracy over other methods. These findings
were obtained using over 1100 participants.
Seldom in studies of forecasting does one
encounter such large improvements in accuracy.
For example, combining, which is regarded as
one of the more important techniques in forecasting, reduces error by about 12% (Armstrong, 2001b). Green’s findings are important.
4. Competent science?
I examined Green’s use of the scientific
method. Considering standard issues regarding
scientific methods and issues raised by reviewers.
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4.1. Was the design objective?
Green used the method of multiple hypotheses. I believe this is an important procedure in
striving for objectivity.
Green tried to avoid biases. Because of
practical considerations, he could not always do
so. As it turned out, the design of his study
favored game theory relative to unaided judgment and role playing.

4.2. Was the literature review complete and
objective?
Green used literature reviews published by
others and references listed in key papers. These
procedures offer protection against the claim
that he might have been biased in his search.
However, he also used the Social Science
Citation Index and Internet searches, which
might lead to bias when screening the papers.
Finally, he sent e-mail messages to 474 game
theorists to determine whether relevant research
might have been overlooked. Given that researchers often advocate their own approaches,
consulting game theorists might have produced
findings favorable to game theory.

4.3. Were the samples of participants large
enough?
Some of the reviewers claimed that the study
was flawed because the sample of participants
was too small. This criticism is unfounded
because the participants based their predictions,
not on their own behavior, but on their knowledge about the behavior of many people. As a
result, expert opinion surveys need only five to
20 experts, depending on such things as the
need for precision, level of expertise, and
variability of knowledge among the experts
(Ashton, 1986; Hogarth, 1978; Libby & Blashfield, 1978). Green obtained forecasts from 21
experts in game theory.
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4.4. Were the samples of participants
representative?
Because Green’s experts assessed the behavior of others, there was no need to have
representative experts. Indeed, one would prefer
the most capable, experienced, and interested
experts. Thus, self-selection is beneficial.
(Studies of survey research have shown that
people who are more interested in a topic are
more likely to respond; Armstrong & Overton,
1977). All of the game theory experts Green
used were self-selected, whereas the roleplayers and unaided judges were often captive
participants in classes. Self-selection would
favor game theory here.
Most of the unaided judges had little expertise. Since they had to draw in part upon their
knowledge of similar situations, they would
seem to be at a disadvantage relative to the
self-selected game theorists.

4.5. Was the sample of situations large
enough?
Green’s study was based on six situations.
Additional situations would improve one’s
confidence in the results. Still, using the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (one-tail), the probability of getting such results would be only 0.03 if
game theory and role playing were equally
accurate methods.
In Armstrong (2001a), I suggested that role
playing was most appropriate when the interactions in a conflict are examined. Because the
Panabla did not involve interactions, I excluded
it and recalculated the percentage of correct
responses. A striking picture emerged. Chance,
unaided judgment, and game theory produce
virtually identical results with about 28% correct predictions, compared with 61% for role
playing.
To assess the sensitivity of these results to the
selection of situations, I then excluded each of
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the other five situations, one at a time. This
allowed for a comparison of the average accuracy with each combination of the remaining four
situations. Again the results were consistent
(Table 1). The error reductions of role playing
over game theory were similar across these
analyses.
Given these results, rather than using the
awkward term ‘‘role playing that simulates
interactions among people’’, we might use the
term ‘‘simulated interactions’’.

4.6. Was the sample of situations
representative?
One possibility is that when selecting situations one is more likely to include ‘interesting’
cases, and that one might have considered them
to be interesting because they were hard to
assess judgmentally. This would constitute a
bias against unaided judgment, thus favoring
game theory and role playing. To assess this
possibility, I examined the extent of the error
reductions of role playing relative to unaided
judgment and compared this to the extent to
which the correct answers were obvious to
unaided judges. The results (Table 2) show no
evidence of bias with respect to easy versus

Table 2
Were the situations biased against judgment?
Situations

Correct by
judgment

Correct by
role playing

Percent
error
Reduction a

Artists’ reprieve
Distribution plan
55% plan
Zenith
Panalba
Nurses

5
5
27
29
34
68

29
75
60
59
76
82

25
74
45
42
64
44

a
The error reduction was calculated as 100 3 (unaided
judgments’ wrong predictions minus RP’s wrong decisions) /(unaided judgments’ wrong predictions).

difficult situations. For example, the error reduction was 48% for the three easiest and 50%
for the three most difficult.

4.7. Did the participants follow the
instructions?
Green studied a practical issue. Assume that
you have a conflict situation. Would it help you
to ask leading game theorists to make predictions and to also ask that they make use of any
relevant expertise in game theory? In a real
situation, the extent to which game theorists

Table 1
Average percentage of correct forecasts with some situations excluded
Excluded
situations

Chance

Unaided
judgment

Game
theory
(GT)

Role
playing
(RP)

% Error
reduction a
RP vs. GT

Panalba

28

27

28

61

46

Also excluding:
Artists
Distribution
55%
Zenith
Nurses

31
27
29
27
27

32
32
27
26
17

33
27
27
29
22

69
58
61
62
56

54
42
47
46
43

a

Error reduction was calculated as 100 3 (GT’s percent wrong predictions minus RP’s percent wrong decisions) /(GT’s
percent wrong predictions).
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were successful would depend not only on the
value of game theory, but on whether they could
successfully match the situation to their knowledge of game theory, and the extent to which
game theory gave them a better understanding
of the situation. One would expect that those
with more experience in game theory would be
more skillful at applying game theory to these
situations. However, Green found that those
with more experience in game theory were no
more accurate in their predictions than novices.
He also found that those spending more time
were not more accurate.
The instructions for unaided judgment were
easy to follow. However, the subjects using role
playing had little experience with this approach.
Most were students, so it seems likely that some
might not have taken the exercise seriously. As
a result, game theory had an advantage over role
playing in that the game theorists should have
been able to follow the instructions.
Green provided minimal extrinsic incentives
to the participants. Would the results have been
different had there been financial incentives?
Remus, O’Connor, and Griggs (1998) examined
the evidence on this issue. Based on ten studies,
they concluded that there is little evidence that
financial incentives would improve accuracy for
judgmental forecasting
Intrinsic incentives would seem to favor the
game theorists because they were asked to use
game theory in making predictions. Presumably,
they would want to see game theory do well,
whereas the other participants had no attachment to their methods.

4.8. Was the administration biased?
The experiments were conducted by researchers who had a prior hypothesis. Might this have
produced an unintended bias that led participants to act as the researchers expected? Such
effects are called ‘demand effects.’ Sigall,
Aronson, and van Hoose (1970) examined the
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evidence and found little support for the theory
that participants cooperate with experimenters.
Rather, their concern seems to be to present
themselves in a favorable light. Because the
game theorists all identified themselves, this
should have led them to have more of a concern
about looking good.
As with any study, bias might occur for other
reasons. Thus, it would be useful if someone
who believed that game theory might have some
advantages over role playing would replicate or
extend the studies.

4.9. Were there biases from variations in
administration?
One reviewer claimed that the design was
faulty because there were variations in the
administrative procedures. For example, Green
allowed different times for different administrations of the forecasting methods. In my opinion,
variations are useful when a potential for bias
exists. Thus, for example, researchers are typically advised to vary the order of the presentation of materials to participants (as Green
did). Variations also allow one to assess whether
administrative procedures have any effect. On
the whole, I saw the variations as a benefit to
Green’s design.

4.10. Did Green provide full disclosure?
Green reported on all of his procedures,
providing important details on the Internet. He
included information about the participants and
explanations of how they made their predictions. For a description of the reasoning the
game theorists used, see kestencgreen.com / approach.pdf.
He was responsive to reviewers when they
asked for additional explanation. As nearly as I
can judge, he has met the requirements for full
disclosure.
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4.11. Would the use of other criteria affect
the conclusions?
Green’s study focused primarily on predictive
validity. The use of a forecasting method also
depends on its cost, acceptability, assessment of
risk, and other factors. Green provides some
details on costs; game theory was the most
expensive approach.
It would be useful to make empirical comparisons on the acceptability of unaided judgment, game theory, and role-playing forecasts. It
seems reasonable to hypothesize that role playing, by showing a vivid and detailed prediction
of decisions, would be compelling to decision
makers.
It is not clear how game theory would alert
decision makers to risk. In contrast, risk can be
assessed through unaided judgment and role
playing. Consider, for example our study of the
journal royalties negotiation, which involved the
International Institute of Forecasters and John
Wiley Publishers (Armstrong & Hutcherson,
1989). Unaided judgment suggested that there
was a 12% chance that the negotiations would
lead to a cancellation of the contract, and role
playing predicted a 42% chance of cancellation.
Cancellation would produce substantial losses to
both parties. Thus, even though the prediction
was that there would be an agreement on
royalties, it would have been prudent to take
steps to avoid a cancellation. In fact, the actual
outcome was a cancellation of the contract.
Game theory may have uses other than
forecasting, such as improving the search for
alternative solutions, although I expect that
formal idea-generation procedures, such as
brainstorming, would prove superior to game
theory for that purpose. Can game theory substantially improve the way managers think
about problems compared to, say, calculating
net present values for alternatives?
In general, then, Green’s results on the su-

periority of role playing hold up for a variety of
criteria.

4.12. Was the paper clearly written?
An important aspect of good research is that
it be clearly written. Green’s paper has a
Flesch–Kinkaid readability index equal to 12th
grade. It is much more readable than typical
scientific papers.

5. Further research
Green’s is the first study on the predictive
validity of game theory. While a single study is
superior to having no studies, it cannot resolve
all of the issues. To date, the research effort
devoted to game theory is probably thousands
of times that devoted to alternative procedures
for analyzing conflicts. My primary recommendation is that game theorists should adopt
the method of multiple hypotheses and embrace
procedures other than game theory.
Does game theory add to an analyst’s way of
making predictions in real situations? As noted
above, the procedures were biased in favor of
game theory. What if 474 non-game-theorist
adults with backgrounds similar to those of the
game theorists were contacted, and the same
situations were presented? Assume then that
those most interested made unaided judgmental
predictions. Would they be as accurate as the
game theorists? If so, one could conclude that
the superiority of the game theorists in Green’s
study was due to their experience rather than to
their knowledge of game theory.
Conflicts vary, so it would be useful to study
the conditions under which each approach is
most effective. To do this, one could examine
more situations, especially if they differed substantially from those in Green’s study. Note, for
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example, that game theory was better than role
playing for the one situation that did not simulate the interactions between groups. Goodwin
(2002) discusses various types of situations. It
would be useful to study real situations that
were suggested by game theorists. To date,
however, my appeals to game theorists to
supply such situations have gone unanswered.
Experts who have experience with conflict
situations might be able to make good forecasts
at a lower cost than role playing. They would be
especially likely to do so if they identify
analogous situations in a structured manner.
Research on analogies might help one to determine whether it is possible to identify relevant experts, how one should structure the
forecasting task, and whether analogies could
lead to low-cost predictions that were as accurate as those by made by role playing.
In his study, Green focused on forecasting.
One might extend the study to decision making.
For example, has game theory led to better
decisions than those that could be obtained by
other methods, such as evaluating the net present value of alternative strategies? Can using
game theory produce a better set of strategies
than using brainstorming or other creative techniques? To date, despite the enormous efforts
devoted to research on game theory, I have been
unable to find evidence that game theory will
improve decision making.

6. Conclusions
The game theorists’ predictions were slightly
more accurate than those from participants
using unaided judgment, although the advantage
may have arisen from biases in the design, such
as the lack of experience on the part of the
participants using unaided judgment. This advantage does not apply however, when the
situations are restricted to conflicts involving a
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series of interactions among the parties in
conflict. Role playing was substantially more
accurate than game theory despite biases favoring game theory.
In general, an examination of the procedures
used in Green’s comparative study of forecasting methods supports his findings. That said,
much can be learned from further study of these
issues. Hopefully, game theory researchers (and
others) will conduct empirical studies that
would assess the value of game theory relative
to other approaches. More important, despite the
substantial benefits identified in research to date,
little research has been done on the use of role
playing as a forecasting technique. In particular,
research is needed for simulated interactions in
cases involving conflicts. We know little about
how to best implement role playing and about
the conditions under which it is most effective
relative to other methods.
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